WoW – Watcher of Watches

WoW Investigations

Luxury cracks down the middle.

Swiss watchmaking is selling fewer and fewer watches, but for more and more money. Who profits from this, who foots the bill, and why are the major manufactures struggling while microbrands and independent masters conquer the market? An analysis of an industry whose true condition may come as a surprise.

Luxury cracks down the middle.

Swiss Watchmaking Pays the Bill

Ever more expensive watches and fewer and fewer pieces sold, rising costs for manufactures and profits concentrated in the hands of a few producers. At the same time, the sector of young brands, such as Christopher Ward, is developing dynamically, while at the opposite end of the spectrum, independent masters and small manufactures like Grönefeld or Laurent Ferrier are gaining increasing importance. Are we merely observing another cyclical shift, or the beginning of a much deeper restructuring of the entire industry?

The Swiss watch industry is undergoing a shift far deeper than a routine sales slowdown, even as it continues to flex its muscles on the surface, showcasing growth in spreadsheets and skyward-bound bar charts in corporate presentations.

Yet beneath this veneer, reality is shouting ever louder that the emperor has no clothes, and problems are multiplying like rats in New York.

The question is no longer just how much a customer is willing to pay for a watch. Increasingly, it is whether the producer can make a profit on it and whether it delivers value that the customer actually wants to pay for.

Over the past decade, the Swiss watch industry achieved something seemingly extraordinary. It began selling significantly fewer watches while generating more and more money from their export.

According to data from the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry (FH), approximately 25.4 million wristwatches valued at CHF 18.3 billion were exported in 2016. Nearly a decade later, that figure dropped to just 14.6 million units, yet their value climbed to CHF 24.4 billion.

Volume plummeted by 43%, while export value grew by over 33%.

One could view this as the spectacular triumph of an exceptionally clever premiumization strategy devised by deservedly well-compensated business geniuses. The industry curbed output, raised average prices, and pivoted toward higher-end products.

Naturally, the drop in volume was not solely driven by this strategy. Competition from smartwatches played an enormous role, hitting lower-priced quartz watches particularly hard. Nevertheless, moving upmarket allowed the industry to sustain—and even expand—export value despite losing millions of units sold.

The crux of the matter is that the gains from this transformation are far from self-evident and are by no means distributed evenly. Meanwhile, the costs of executing it are borne by far more businesses than actually profit from it.

Furthermore, due to the consolidation of financial results within major luxury conglomerates such as LVMH, the Swatch Group, or Richemont, the true health of individual brands remains largely concealed from outside observers.

This is standard reporting practice, not proof of financial manipulation. From an economic analysis standpoint, however, it effectively obscures which manufactures are genuinely profitable and which are merely leaning on the financial backing of their parent company.

Today, Swiss watchmaking is beginning to resemble an industry where a handful of producers thrive, while a significant portion of the remaining companies increasingly feels the pinch of shrinking economies of scale.

At the same time, businesses that make no attempt to replicate the traditional large-scale manufacture model are capturing growing attention. Some offer highly compelling watches at much more accessible price points, while others produce merely several dozen or a few hundred pieces per year, finding clients ready to pay hundreds of thousands of francs for them.

These seemingly contradictory phenomena are, in fact, intimately linked.

Luxury Priced Part of Its Own Audience Out of the Market

To grasp the plight of watchmakers, one must first look at the broader luxury goods market.

According to an analysis by McKinsey and The Business of Fashion, over 80% of the growth in the luxury market’s value between 2019 and 2023 was driven by price increases rather than higher sales volumes.

It is worth recalling here the concept described by American economist Thorstein Veblen.

The Veblen effect posits that for certain luxury goods, a high price alone can enhance a product’s appeal, as it serves as a signifier of status, prestige, and exclusivity.

In other words, an item can become more desirable precisely because it is exceedingly expensive.

For years, many luxury producers leveraged this mechanism with great success. Relentlessly higher prices not only boosted revenues but also reinforced the aura of exclusivity.

The trouble is that the Veblen effect does not operate automatically, and it certainly does not work indefinitely. A brand will not become more sought-after simply by slapping on another 20% price hike.

Rolex or Patek Philippe can lean on an exceptionally formidable market position, brand awareness, and demand for their most coveted references. But a producer whose watches gather dust in retail displays will not turn more exclusive purely by issuing a revised price list.

At a certain point, price ceases to be an affirmation of status and becomes an outright barrier to purchase.

And that inflection point may well have arrived for a segment of traditional watchmakers.

Bain & Company estimates that the global population of luxury consumers shrank from approximately 400 million in 2022 to around 330 million in 2025. That represents a loss of roughly 70 million active buyers in three years.

This does not mean everyone suddenly went broke. Some curbed their spending; others redirected their budgets toward travel, experiential luxury, or the secondary market. Still others decided that continuous price hikes were no longer justified by the products on offer.

The financial reports of top-tier firms illustrate just how unevenly this shift is unfolding.

Hermès posted revenues of EUR 12.26 billion in the first nine months of 2026, advancing 5.5% at constant exchange rates. Yet even within such a resilient powerhouse, individual product categories performed quite differently.

While leather goods sales rose by 10.2%, Hermès’ watch division recorded a 1.9% decline.

A luxury brand's overall clout does not automatically guarantee triumph across every vertical, as I have pointed out many times before. The Midas touch is often quite illusory.

When it comes to watches, an additional dynamic comes into play: the astonishing ease of product comparison and information sharing.

A prospective buyer can scrutinize movement specifications, finishing quality, technical solutions, service costs, or secondary market values in minutes. Purchasing decisions no longer have to rely exclusively on marketing gloss and retail storytelling.

Consequently, justifying escalating prices on the sheer recognition of a logo is becoming increasingly difficult.

One Percent of Watches, One Third of the Market Value

In October 2026, The Economist published an article titled The Swiss watch industry is shrinking, but getting swankier, detailing the mounting concentration of the Swiss watch market around the most expensive products and the strongest brands.

The figures cited by the weekly are remarkably telling.

According to estimates by Morgan Stanley and LuxeConsult, watches priced above CHF 50,000 accounted for merely 1.4% of volume in 2025, while representing 37% of the total value of Swiss watch exports.

A year earlier, their value share stood at 33.5%.

Moreover, according to the same report, this segment accounted for 89% of the market’s total value growth in 2025.

Naturally, these are analysts' estimates rather than a standalone category reported in official FH statistics. Soaring precious metal prices also contributed to the inflated values.

Yet the sheer degree of concentration is staggering.

A tiny fraction of production is generating an ever-larger portion of the entire industry’s value.

The Economist also pointed out that out of approximately 450 Swiss watch brands, a mere five—Rolex, Cartier, Patek Philippe, Omega, and Audemars Piguet—generated roughly 60% of the industry’s estimated revenues in 2025.

Meanwhile, Morgan Stanley and LuxeConsult reported that the four largest privately owned brands—Rolex, Patek Philippe, Audemars Piguet, and Richard Mille—commanded around 49% of total sales value, up from an estimated 37% in 2019.

These are two distinct datasets, yet both point in the same direction.

An increasingly smaller circle of producers is capturing an ever-larger share of the revenue pool.

Analysts estimated that as many as 29 of the top 50 Swiss brands saw their turnover contract in 2025.

It must be noted that the precision of the Morgan Stanley and LuxeConsult calculations became the subject of a public dispute with the Swatch Group. The holding company highlighted concrete discrepancies between the estimates and its internal figures, amounting to an average variance of 24% regarding the analyzed brands’ revenues.

Hence, not every figure in that report should be treated as audited financial data. Nevertheless, the overarching trend toward consolidation is impossible to overlook, even when factoring in a significant margin of error.

This creates a distinct paradox.

An industry built on producing millions of watches is tethering its financial value more and more to the sale of a relatively small number of hyper-expensive pieces.

For Rolex or Patek, that may be splendid news.

For a manufacturer of movements, cases, dials, and hands whose plant was configured to produce hundreds of thousands of components annually, decidedly less so.

A watch priced at 200,000 francs can generate an eye-watering margin. However, it cannot replace an order for thousands of components for an upstream supplier.

Yet it was precisely on large-scale industrial volumes that much of the Swiss watchmaking infrastructure was built over decades.

When an In-House Manufacture Becomes a Financial Millstone

For years, the Swiss watch industry evolved around the gospel of vertical integration.

Operating an in-house manufacture, developing proprietary movements, and controlling successive stages of production were supposed to guarantee technological independence, top-tier quality, competitive advantage, and, ultimately, superior margins.

A factory, however, incurs fixed costs regardless of how many watches are actually sold. Buildings must be maintained, machinery serviced, master craftspeople paid, and R&D expenditures amortized over years.

If a manufacture was planned and staffed to build 30,000 watches a year but sells only 10,000, its overhead does not magically shrink by two-thirds.

Those fixed costs continue to burden the profit-and-loss statement, eating away at the margins earned on the watches that do sell.

Granted, within a large corporate group, profitable brands can subsidize struggling ones, absorb losses, share production infrastructure, and capitalize on economies of scale.

Yet there is always a catch.

For how long can a handful of exceptionally lucrative brands finance the swelling upkeep costs of the rest?

Meanwhile, for years, many brands expanded their facilities, invested in new calibers, and added headcount, operating under the assumption of perpetual demand growth—as if oblivious to the old stock market adage that trees do not grow to the sky.

From my own executive experience, I know all too well how corporate games are played. Shareholders and supervisory boards demand ceaseless increases in sales, EBITDA, net profits, and consecutive triumphs.

The strategy must forecast growth, the budget must promise more growth, and the slide deck for the owner had better promise even more.

Except the real economy is not a PowerPoint presentation.

Deloitte reports that between 2016 and 2025, employment in the Swiss watch industry grew by around 14%, even as the number of exported watches tumbled by 43%.

To be sure, crafting more complicated watches can require more manual labor, and employment shifts also reflect structural reorganizations within the trade. Even so, the sheer scale of this divergence prompts uncomfortable questions about resource efficiency.

Even more intriguing are the employment figures for 2025.

According to the Swiss daily Le Temps, the industry shed 1,341 production jobs over the course of the year, while simultaneously adding 396 administrative roles and another 124 executive positions.

This does not automatically point to administrative bloat, but is it not a fascinating trajectory?

The headcount at the workbenches and machines dwindles, while offices and managerial ranks swell.

In Deloitte’s September survey, a staggering 79% of surveyed suppliers cited declining production volumes as a critical structural risk or a factor compelling a change in business model.

This is especially critical because behind every famous brand stands an entire industrial ecosystem: suppliers of movements, cases, dials, hands, springs, tooling, and specialized machinery.

When a major brand slashes its orders, its supplier cannot always compensate by hiking prices. And when orders evaporate, they cannot be replaced merely by spinning yarns about Swiss precision and the mystique of a century-old heritage.

Richemont and Swatch Group: Two Sides of the Same Coin

The scale of this turbulence is most vividly reflected in the financial performance of the major conglomerates.

In the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, Richemont’s Jewellery Maisons division—which includes Cartier and Van Cleef & Arpels—generated over EUR 5 billion in operating profit with an operating margin of 30.5%.

Meanwhile, its Specialist Watchmakers division—comprising names such as IWC, Jaeger-LeCoultre, Panerai, Roger Dubuis, and Vacheron Constantin—scraped together just EUR 107 million in operating profit on EUR 3.15 billion in revenue.

The operating margin stood at a meager 3.4%.

Given corporate realities, one might say honor was barely saved. The drowning man was granted just enough room to keep his nose above water to gasp for air.

Let us recall that a mere three years earlier, this division’s operating profit stood at EUR 738 million, with a 19% margin.

In three years, operating profit plummeted by over 85%.

In fact, "plummeted" is a rather polite euphemism. It fell off a cliff.

This does not imply that every Richemont watch brand is running in the red. The holding company does not break down individual profit-and-loss statements for each manufacture, and Cartier’s watch revenues are booked under Jewellery Maisons rather than Specialist Watchmakers.

Nevertheless, such severe margin erosion across an entire division cannot be swept under the rug—especially since Richemont itself cites the burden of fixed costs against reduced sales volumes.

The Swatch Group presents an entirely different, yet equally instructive, case.

In 2025, the group reported CHF 6.28 billion in net sales, an operating profit of CHF 135 million, and a net profit of just CHF 25 million.

Its operating margin was... 2.1%.

Interestingly, the Watches & Jewelry segment excluding manufacturing generated CHF 549 million in operating profit. The Production segment, however, posted a massive loss.

The Swatch Group explained that it deliberately maintained production capacities and workforce levels despite lower factory utilization, anticipating a future rebound in demand.

In other words: defend the strategy at all costs, because things are bound to look up eventually. Sooner or later, we will see the light at the end of the tunnel. Let us just hope it is not the headlights of an oncoming locomotive.

The Economist highlighted the immense scale of the group’s industrial footprint and the challenge of supporting an infrastructure built for vastly larger volumes.

At the end of 2025, the Swatch Group held inventories valued at CHF 7.295 billion, including finished goods worth approximately CHF 3.66 billion. This encompassed not only finished timepieces, but also raw materials, components, work-in-progress, and precious metals.

This entire sum should not, therefore, be equated directly with unsold watches languishing in boutiques. Still, it is worth noting that inventories represented more than half of the group’s total assets.

Crucially, the Swatch Group possesses a rock-solid balance sheet and faces no immediate solvency threat. It can afford a long-haul strategy that many standalone companies could simply never finance.

This raises the question of what the true profitability of individual manufactures would look like if they had to independently finance their production, R&D, inventory, and global distribution.

And, by extension, how long such a model can be sustained without destroying shareholder value.

Zenith: When the Owner’s Patience Runs Out

In October 2026, the industry's woes ceased to be merely an academic topic for financial analysts.

Zenith, owned by LVMH, entered consultations over a deep restructuring. According to Le Temps and Reuters, roughly 100 jobs at the manufacture in Le Locle could be on the line, alongside a similar number across its international sales and distribution network.

CEO Benoît de Clerck pointed to an industrial and commercial infrastructure designed for far greater volumes than those currently realized. In remarks to The Business of Fashion, he conceded that under its existing cost structure, the company could not reach breakeven and break its cycle of recurring losses.

I have written about Zenith in a separate article, so there is no need to repeat myself here. Suffice it to say that the situation is serious enough that one should probably be lighting candles rather than popping champagne.

What is most telling, however, is the proposed direction of the restructuring. Zenith intends to pivot its catalog toward even more expensive, higher-end watches.

In short: trying to cure insufficient demand by selling fewer, costlier timepieces.

That play can succeed, but only on one condition: that a large enough cohort of buyers is ready and willing to buy them.

Simply hiking the price tag does not conjure a market out of thin air.

The Industry Is Already Making Painful Choices

Zenith is hardly an isolated case.

In February 2025, Swiss outlets including Bilanz and Handelszeitung reported on the decision to wind down Carl F. Bucherer, which Rolex had acquired alongside the Bucherer retail chain in 2023.

According to investigative reports, the brand had struggled with profitability for years. Not all reports of the shutdown were officially verified at the time, so one must distinguish between reports of operational cessation and the formal corporate liquidation of the entity.

An even clearer example is Baume & Mercier.

On July 1, 2026, Richemont completed the sale of the brand to the Italian Damiani Group. The new owner operates its own watch and jewelry retail network, potentially allowing it to trim commercial overhead by leveraging existing retail infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Ulysse Nardin and Girard-Perregaux have operated independently of Kering within the Sowind Group since a 2022 management buyout.

By 2024, the group was already relying on short-time work schemes to avert sweeping layoffs. In November 2025, it announced the elimination of 26 positions out of a global workforce of roughly 410.

This does not suggest that either brand is insolvent. It does demonstrate, however, that independence from a luxury conglomerate requires aligning operating expenses with market realities.

Jaquet Droz took yet another path, abandoning classical serial production and wide-reaching retail distribution in favor of ultra-high-end bespoke commissions.

From a business perspective, this may prove to be a remarkably sensible pivot.

What these cases share is a simple truth: conducting business as usual is no longer an option.

Who’s Next? Candidates for the "Slaughter of the Innocents"

Behind closed doors, specific names are surfacing with increasing frequency. And these are by no means obscure workshops, but historic houses whose timepieces have occupied prime real estate in the world’s most prestigious showcases for decades.

Zenith, IWC, Jaeger-LeCoultre, Panerai, Roger Dubuis, Girard-Perregaux, Ulysse Nardin, Breguet, and Blancpain.

Of course, each of these houses faces a unique reality; they cannot all be lumped together.

Zenith has formally embarked on a major overhaul, with leadership acknowledging that its current operating model cannot achieve breakeven.

In August 2026, IWC confirmed the elimination of 18 roles in Schaffhausen. This is hardly a mass layoff given its roughly 800 employees at that site, but it serves as a clear signal of organizational right-sizing in response to cooling demand.

It is worth noting that Morgan Stanley estimated IWC's sales to have grown by roughly 5% in 2025. Job cuts alone are therefore not proof of a brand-wide commercial collapse.

Girard-Perregaux and Ulysse Nardin have trimmed staff under Sowind, and their independent model serves as a compelling real-world test of viability outside a corporate umbrella.

Panerai and Roger Dubuis, meanwhile, remain brands where analyst estimates and the broader malaise within Richemont’s Specialist Watchmakers division invite legitimate questions regarding their profitability at current operational scales.

Similar questions can be raised regarding Swatch Group’s Breguet and Blancpain.

However, one cannot attribute specific balance-sheet losses to them based solely on the Morgan Stanley report. Swatch Group contested the estimates regarding its portfolio, and granular operational figures are not made public.

Jaeger-LeCoultre, for its part, remains an intriguing case of a manufacture endowed with immense technical prowess and capital-intensive industrial facilities. We do not know its exact operating result, and Richemont signaled improving sales momentum for the brand in the second half of its most recent fiscal year.

I am not asserting that all of these companies are loss-making, let alone teetering on the brink of bankruptcy.

Without access to the internal balance sheets, cash flows, and debt obligations of each entity, such a claim would be intellectually dishonest.

I would, however, pose a different question.

Does anyone genuinely believe that every single one of these manufactures, if cut off from the deep pockets of its parent company, could sustain its current organizational footprint, production volume, product catalog, and retail network?

In some cases, the answer might be yes. In others, it would almost certainly necessitate severe, painful restructuring.

What is undeniable is that we are increasingly discussing enterprises that craft magnificent products, but do not necessarily possess equally magnificent business models.

Two Rebellions Against Traditional Luxury

Here lies one of the most compelling paradoxes of modern horology.

While several historic manufactures grapple with declining unit sales and climbing overhead, two distinct groups of producers—having seemingly nothing in common—are capturing consumer fascination.

The first delivers compelling watches at far more approachable prices.

The second produces ultra-limited runs, frequently priced well above the offerings of established Swiss houses.

Yet both groups, in their own way, challenge the exact same paradigm: the assumption that a steep price tag should be dictated primarily by brand recognition and prestige within a traditional luxury hierarchy.

Christopher Ward: Must a Great Watch Really Cost a Fortune?

Christopher Ward is one of the most remarkable success stories of recent years.

Founded in the UK in 2004, the brand embraced a direct-to-consumer (D2C) model from day one, bypassing the burdensome overhead of traditional retail networks.

Instead of pouring massive budgets into celebrity ambassadors, lavish ad campaigns, and flagship boutiques, it focused on product execution and an unfiltered relationship with the enthusiast community.

Initially, it was just one of many upstarts lumped under the "microbrand" label. Today, it can hardly be considered a niche player.

According to Morgan Stanley/LuxeConsult, Christopher Ward generated approximately CHF 51 million in revenue in 2025—a 50% year-over-year surge—selling around 39,000 watches. For the first time, it cracked the ranking of the top 50 Swiss watch brands by turnover.

Christopher Ward does not try to convince buyers that it is the next Rolex. It pitches an entirely different value proposition: thoughtful design, high manufacturing quality, Swiss movements, and a price tag easily justified by tangible specifications.

Crucially, this is not merely about entry-level pieces. The C1 Bel Canto demonstrated that the company can deliver chiming complications and sophisticated engineering at a price point dramatically lower than comparable complications from heritage houses.

A similar philosophy, albeit executed through different avenues, can be seen in brands like NOMOS, Sinn, Formex, Baltic, Oris, or segments of Grand Seiko.

Then there are newer ventures like Norqain, founded in 2018 and already turning out several thousand watches a year. The Economist points to it as an example of a brand that, rather than leaning on centuries of heritage, aims to cultivate appeal through modern materials, design, and technical partnerships.

Not all of these firms are microbrands, not all operate via D2C, and their margins vary. What unites them is offering the consumer an alternative price justification.

In their playbook, the intrinsic product takes precedence over the promise of social ascent through luxury affiliation.

And perhaps that is precisely why a growing segment of collectors is becoming vocal in its frustration with the relentless price creep of traditional brands.

Because the question is asked with increasing urgency: for several thousand euros more, is the buyer actually receiving a superior watch, or merely paying for a more expensive logo?

Grönefeld and Laurent Ferrier: Why Pay a Fortune for a Mass-Produced Watch?

At the polar opposite end of the market, a seemingly contradictory trend is thriving.

Demand is surging for independent artisanal manufactures like Grönefeld, Laurent Ferrier, Kari Voutilainen, Rexhep Rexhepi, Simon Brette, and MB&F.

Their watches are not cheap. They routinely command tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of francs.

Yet the client here is buying something fundamentally different from what a heritage manufacture producing tens of thousands of timepieces per year can provide.

They are buying a direct lineage to the watchmaker, hyper-limited production, bespoke technical solutions, and often the privilege of speaking directly with the individual responsible for designing and assembling their timepiece.

Brothers Bart and Tim Grönefeld, working out of Oldenzaal in the Netherlands, have cited an annual production capacity of just 70 to 80 watches for their primary manufacture.

Laurent Ferrier offers an even more instructive case from an economic standpoint.

According to figures published by Forbes Argentina, the manufacture produced 570 watches in 2025. In an earlier interview with Europa Star, CEO Florent Perrichon noted that the company was profitable, carried no external debt, and had no intention of building its own boutique network.

Rather than funding dozens of retail outposts, sprawling marketing departments, and inventory buildup, the company can focus on a curated clientele and healthy unit margins, relying on carefully selected retail partners.

Of course, not every independent watchmaker runs a license to print money. Scarcity and high price tags do not guarantee viability, and developing proprietary movements can be ruinously expensive.

Yet these examples demonstrate that a manufacture can thrive without pursuing relentless volume expansion and industrial sprawl.

Interestingly, even the most revered independent creators recognize the appetite for more accessible offerings.

Max Büsser launched M.A.D.Editions in 2021, initially as a thank-you project for the community supporting MB&F, before expanding it to the broader public. Among these is the M.A.D.2, introduced in 2025 at CHF 2,900 plus VAT, powered by a La Joux-Perret movement fitted with an in-house module developed by MB&F.

The Grönefeld brothers took a similar route, establishing the standalone brand Grøne in 2024 with the Manueel One, priced at EUR 2,150 before taxes and housing a modified Sellita SW210 caliber.

In neither instance was the goal to dilute the flagship brand with a watered-down variant; rather, it was to launch an independent concept with a completely distinct cost structure and production methodology.

This underscores that even the masters of high horology can deliver an inventive, auteur-driven design at a fraction of their primary manufacture’s price point.

One does not always need to develop yet another hyper-complex caliber to create a watch that captures the imagination of the watchmaking world.

Sometimes, the greatest business innovation lies not in conceiving a new movement, but in rethinking how a timepiece is conceived, manufactured, and sold.

Are Collectors Really Walking Away from Patek and Vacheron Constantin?

It would be an exaggeration to claim that the rise of independent ateliers heralds a mass exodus of clients from the grand houses.

Patek Philippe remains one of the most formidable luxury brands on earth. Rolex and Audemars Piguet likewise enjoy peerless market insulation.

Nevertheless, for a subset of seasoned collectors, institutional luxury is no longer the sole aspirational destination.

Vacheron Constantin produces tens of thousands of timepieces annually. Patek Philippe also operates at an industrial scale that cannot be compared to the intimate workbench of an independent horologist.

To the average consumer, these pieces represent the pinnacle of exclusivity. To an experienced collector who already owns multiple pieces from these houses, adding another standard production model may feel somewhat mundane.

This is where the independent scene finds its opening.

A collector may well decide that rather than purchasing yet another piece from an institutional manufacture, their funds are better spent on a watch crafted by a small team producing only a few dozen pieces a year.

They are not necessarily motivated by liquidity or resale value. Often, they are happy to pay a premium for mechanical ingenuity, design originality, or a personal relationship with the watchmaker.

Hence, the ascent of Christopher Ward and the booming appeal of boutiques like Grönefeld or Laurent Ferrier—despite operating at entirely different price tiers—share a common catalyst.

In both cases, the client is seeking a tighter correlation between the price paid and what is actually delivered.

One buyer seeks superior value for money; the other demands individuality and authentic rarity.

Both are increasingly questioning how much of the price tag reflects the watch itself, and how much merely subsidizes corporate overhead and brand equity.

The Secondary Market Is No Longer an Inconvenient Footnote

For generations, brands exerted near-total control over how the price and value of their watches were communicated to the public.

Today, a prospective buyer can cross-reference the market value of comparable references on Chrono24, WatchCharts, or similar platforms in seconds.

A high retail price is no longer the sole benchmark of worth.

According to WatchCharts, the volume-weighted difference between retail and secondary market prices across 22 analyzed Ulysse Nardin models sits at roughly -48.9%.

By comparison, the same index indicates that current Patek Philippe models command an average secondary market premium of about 24%, with Rolex hovering near 15%. Conversely, Vacheron Constantin shows an average discount of roughly 25%, while IWC trades near a 39% discount.

These are profound disparities.

They do not mean that every reference from a given brand behaves uniformly. Individual references can perform radically differently, and WatchCharts metrics focus on select modern production models within the US market.

Nor should secondary market depreciation be confused with an authorized dealer’s discretionary discount.

Nevertheless, if a collector knows that a timepiece can be acquired on the secondary market for substantially less, the manufacture must provide a compelling reason to buy it brand-new at retail.

That reason might be the factory warranty, the retail experience, personalization, allocation of rare references, or fierce brand loyalty.

The abstract promise of prestige, however, is no longer always enough.

Furthermore, pre-owned trading is becoming an institutional pillar of the wider industry. Rolex continues to roll out its Certified Pre-Owned program, where used watches are authenticated and re-sold with a factory warranty through authorized partners.

The market's most powerful players are thus actively capturing value throughout the entire lifecycle of their timepieces.

For brands whose products shed a large chunk of their value the moment they leave the boutique, this adds severe competitive pressure.

The Biggest Loser Might Not Even Have Its Own Logo

When the future of horology is debated, the conversation inevitably centers on Rolex, Omega, Patek, IWC, or Zenith.

Yet one of the most perilous consequences of these shifts may well be the slow erosion of the supply chain ecosystem.

In September 2025, the Swiss watch industry employed 64,807 people—835 fewer than the prior year. The sharpest declines struck the traditional industrial cantons that house the makers of components, tooling, and sub-assemblies.

When a heritage brand scales back its output from 20,000 to 10,000 watches per year, it can attempt to safeguard margins by elevating prices and moving upmarket.

Its supplier, however, saddled with CNC machines and specialized staff calibrated to turn out tens of thousands of components, cannot pivot so easily.

The more Swiss watchmaking concentrates on ultra-expensive, low-volume timepieces, the greater the danger of hollowing out the broad industrial base that underpinned its global dominance for decades.

Some suppliers are already diversifying into medical technology, high jewelry, and precision micro-engineering for other sectors.

Not all of them, however, have the capital or capability to make that leap.

This creates a worrying paradox: individual brands may prop up their profitability by curtailing volumes, while simultaneously starving the specialized supplier network upon which their future production relies.

Moreover, the flourishing of independent ateliers cannot compensate for lost industrial-scale contracts.

An artisan workshop crafting 100 watches a year can be fabulously successful, but it will never replace a corporate purchase order for tens of thousands of movement plates, pinions, or cases.

In a decade or two, the existential threat to the industry may not be a shortage of buyers for 200,000-franc watches.

The threat may be the irreversible loss of institutional manufacturing knowledge, specialized tooling, and suppliers, should the market for serially produced mechanical watches continue to shrink.

This is arguably one of the most underestimated structural vulnerabilities facing Swiss watchmaking today.

It is entirely possible to preserve the prestige and balance sheets of a handful of luxury titans, while gradually letting the industrial bedrock upon which the entire industry was constructed crumble away.

Tariffs, China, and the Rebound Mirage

In September 2026, Swiss watch exports rose by 11.7% compared to the same period the previous year.

Over the first nine months, export value reached CHF 19.5 billion, marking a 2.7% increase.

Is this proof that the storm has passed? Hardly.

In September, exports to the United States surged by an eye-popping 85.7%, while shipments to mainland China fell by 14.2%.

There are very specific mechanical reasons behind this dramatic disparity.

In August 2025, the United States imposed punitive 39% tariffs on Swiss goods. It was not until November that an agreement was reached to lower the rate to 15%, with the revised rules implemented in December and applied retroactively to November 14, 2025.

This severely distorted shipping schedules, distributor restocking patterns, and year-over-year comparatives.

Furthermore, export statistics track goods leaving Swiss borders; they tell us nothing about whether those watches were actually purchased by retail consumers in that month.

An export uptick can easily stem from pipeline replenishment, logistics adjustments, or favorable base effects.

To genuinely assess a brand's health, one must examine true sell-through to end consumers, operating margins, inventory turnover, and free cash flow.

Layer on a stubbornly strong Swiss franc, sky-high prices for gold and raw materials, and persistent macroeconomic headwinds in China, and the picture becomes far more complex.

The industry may well be experiencing a temporary statistical "rebound" without having resolved any of its structural fractures.

And corporate slides flipping back to green does not mean businesses have actually figured out how to operate more profitably.

The Hardest Question: Could This Brand Survive on Its Own?

Mega-conglomerates can subsidize underperforming brands for years, absorb capital expenditures for sprawling factories, and underwrite the development of endless proprietary calibers.

Yet one ought to ask a question that is rarely voiced in polite industry panels, but whisper-debated in private rooms.

Would this brand be profitable if it had to fund its own manufacturing facilities, movement R&D, marketing campaigns, retail network, inventory holding, and after-sales service entirely out of its own cash flow?

Do its monobrand boutiques actually pull their own weight?

Does the cost of engineering yet another in-house caliber make any economic sense given the realistic production volume it will achieve?

Are end customers truly paying retail list prices?

And finally: if this brand did not exist today, would an independent investor commit their own capital to build it from scratch in its current form?

That final question is the ultimate litmus test.

Because one can wax poetic endlessly about tradition, lineage, technical virtuosity, and manufacture heritage. One can also bankroll consecutive loss-making years in the hope that the tide will turn.

At some point, however, someone has to tally up the figures and determine whether the enterprise makes economic sense.

And if the answer is no, prestige alone will not pay the salaries, settle supplier invoices, or keep the lights on in the manufacture.

Redefining Success

The coming years will reveal which brands can adapt to this new operating environment.

A select few will continue to generate extraordinary profits thanks to unrivaled brand equity, insatiable demand, and disciplined supply control.

Others will pivot toward the high-margin, low-volume model of bespoke and limited-run independent watchmaking.

Still others will have to streamline their catalogs, shutter unprofitable boutiques, embrace outsourced calibers, or fundamentally reinvent their commercial strategy.

Some will inevitably vanish.

Volume alone will not dictate their survival. One can run a thriving, profitable manufacture producing several hundred watches a year; one can also bleed cash trying to sell tens of thousands.

By the same token, not every company crafting six-figure watches is an inherently sound business, just as not every accessible brand is condemned to razor-thin margins.

The ultimate determinant will be the equilibrium between genuine demand, achievable transaction prices, and the true cost of running the business.

The watch enthusiast is evolving as well.

At one end of the market, buyers are seeking transparency, tangible build quality, and a price that is easily justified by the watch itself.

At the other, they demand uncompromising individuality that cannot be delivered by an institutional brand producing tens of thousands of units a year.

The most vulnerable players may well be those trapped in no-man's-land: too expensive to compete on product value alone, yet insufficiently rare or compelling to justify top-tier luxury pricing.

In that sense, Swiss watchmaking does not suffer from a lack of exceptional watches.

Its dilemma is that a magnificent watch does not always make for a magnificent business.

And that is perhaps the most sobering takeaway from the industry's current inflection point.

Modern luxury, after all, faces two bills.

The first is presented by the consumer, who increasingly demands to know why a timepiece costs as much as it does.

The second is presented by economics, which bluntly asks the producer whether it can still turn a profit at that price.

Because while today's watch buyer may still love a good story...

They are checking the footnotes more carefully than ever.


Sources and Data Baseline

Data current as of November 2, 2026. Morgan Stanley/LuxeConsult estimates for individual brands do not represent audited financial statements. Profitability statements from privately held manufactures likewise do not substitute for formal financial filings.

  1. Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry FH, official export statistics, data for 2016, 2025, and September 2026.

  2. Deloitte, Swiss Watch Industry Insights 2026: Spotlight on the Supplier Universe, September 30, 2026.

  3. The Economist, The Swiss watch industry is shrinking—but getting swankier, October 1, 2026.

  4. McKinsey / The Business of Fashion, The State of Luxury 2025, January 2025.

  5. Bain & Company / Altagamma, Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study 2025, November 2025.

  6. Morgan Stanley/LuxeConsult, 2025 ranking overview via Hodinkee, February 25, 2026.

  7. Swatch Group, official response to Morgan Stanley, February 27, 2026.

  8. Richemont, FY2026 Financial Results and FY2023 Results.

  9. Swatch Group, Key Figures 2025 and Annual Report 2025.

  10. Hermès International, Nine-Month Revenue 2026.

  11. Le Temps, Zenith restructuring, October 22, 2026; The Business of Fashion, October 22, 2026; Reuters, October 23, 2026.

  12. JCK, reporting on Carl F. Bucherer, February 2025.

  13. Richemont, completion of Baume & Mercier divestment, July 1, 2026.

  14. Swissinfo / Keystone-SDA, headcount reductions at Sowind, November 25, 2025.

  15. Schaffhauser Nachrichten, IWC job cuts, August 21, 2026.

  16. Le Temps, structural employment shifts in watchmaking, December 16, 2025.

  17. WatchCharts, Value Retention by Brand, list price vs. secondary market analysis.

  18. Watch Insider, interview with Mike France on Christopher Ward, 2026.

  19. Europa Star, Laurent Ferrier’s Steady Rise to Success, September 2025, and Forbes Argentina, Laurent Ferrier, 2026.

  20. Hodinkee, M.A.D.Editions M.A.D.2, March 2025.

  21. Grøne, official information on the Manueel One, 2024.

  22. Swiss Federal Government, reduction of US tariffs, December 10, 2025.

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